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Securities Law-Rule 10b-5-They Had So Many Plaintiffs They
Didn't Know What To Do
In surveying the development of "standing" criteria under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and SEC rule lOb-52
it is hard not to think of Humpty Dumpty who told Alice, "When I use
a word, . . . it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor
less."3 The history of standing criteria is one of constant redefinition.
In early cases, only purchasers or sellers had standing to sue for fraud
violations of IOb-5. Exceptions have developed through expansive inter-
pretations of the words "purchaser" and "seller." Critics have sug-
gested and one appellate court has switched to a "new" criterion 4 in
which investors rather than purchasers and sellers have standing. Ac-
ceptance of this test reminds this writer of another of Alice's acquaint-
ances, the Red Queen, who told Alice, "[it takes all the running you
can do, to keep in the same place." After more than two decades
1. 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
()" 'To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so reg-
istered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any devise, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
3. L. CARROLL, THROUGH Tim LOOKING GLASS (1871), reprinted in THn AN-
NOTATED ALICE 269 (M. Gardner ed. 1960) (emphasis omitted).
4. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1979 (1974); Bradford, Rule 10b-5: The Search for a Limiting
Doctrine, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1970) (advocates amendments by Congress and
the SEC); Note, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to SEC Rule 10b-5, 53 CORNELL L.
REV. 684 (1968) (advocates standing for "any person"); Comment, The Purchaser-
Seller Rule: An Archaic Tool for Determining Standing Under Rule 10b-5, 56 GEO.
L.J. 1177 (1968) (advocates investor standing); Note, 10b-5 Standing Under Birnbaum:
The Case of the Missing Remedy, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1007 (1973) (advocates "case or
controversy" standing); Comment, The Birnbaum Doctrine Revisited: Standing to Sue
Under Rule 10b-5 Analyzed, 37 Mo. L. REv. 481 (1972) (advocates investor standing
tied to a purchase or sale); 1967 DUKE L.J. 898 (advocates investor standing).
5. L. CARROLL, ThRoUGH Tim LoOKMNG GLASS (1871), reprinted in Tim AN.
NOTATED ALicE 210 (M. Gardner ed. 1960) (emphasis omitted).
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of case by case adjudication, we start the process over again using
different terminology.
The purchaser-seller rule originated with Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp.0 in which the plaintiff brought an -action on a statutory
tort theory. Judge Augustus Hand writing for the Second Circuit held
that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 protected only purchasers and sellers;
-therefore, the plaintiff lacked standing.7
By the mid-sixties, however, exceptions had developed to the ex-
tent that the opponents of the purchaser-seller rule prepared to cele-
brate its final demise.8 But the prophets of doom spoke too soon, for
the Birnbaum doctrine survived, "[bloody but unbowed."9  In the
early seventies, the courts were close to settling upon an expanded, yet
functional, purchaser-seller rule. The Ninth Circuit decision in Mount
Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell' typified the state of the law. The
court decided that the flexibility required in the application of lOb-
5 was possible within the purchaser-seller restriction. In addition to
permitting standing for purchasers and sellers," the court recognized
exceptions giving standing to parties to an aborted contract for purchase
or sale,' 2 and to "forced sellers" in short form mergers.1 3 An exception
has also been recognized for plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief.'"
6. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
7. Id. at 464. Some courts and some commentators have failed to recognize that
Birnbaum enunciated a rule of statutory standing. E.g., Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip
Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 146 (9th Cir. 1973) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting); Mount Clemens
Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1972); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d
792, 805 (5th Cir. 1970); Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 ALA.
L. REV. 543, 549-50 (1971); Note, 24 H-AsTiNs L.., supra note 4, at 1036; Comment,
37 Mo. L. REv., supra note 4 (initially distinguished statutory and constitutional stand-
ing but confused them in conclusion); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Requirement of
10b-5 Reevaluated, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 151, 159 (1972). Their analyses of the pur-
chaser-seller rule in terms of constitutional standing requirements is responsible for some
of the imprecision in the analysis of 10b-5 standing problems. See text accompanying
notes 43-53 infra.
8. Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law?" An Assessment, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1146
(1965); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for 10b-5, 54
VA. L. Rav. 268 (1968); Note, 53 CORNEL L. REV., supra note 4; Note, Inroads on
the Necessity for a Consummated Purchase or Sale Under Rule 10b-5, 1969 DuKE L.J.
349; Comment, 56 GEO. LI, supra note 4; Comment, Another Demise of the Birn-
baum Doctrine: "Tolls the Knell of Parting Day?", 25 U. MIAMI I. RIv. 131 (1970);
Comment, The Decline of the Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule l0b-5, 14 VILL. L.
Rav. 499 (1969).
9. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970).
10. 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972).
11. Id. at 345. The plaintiff could sue either individually or derivatively. Id. at
347 n.14.
12. Id. at 345-46.
13. Id. at 346.
14. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); cf. Mount
Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 346 (9th Cir. 1972).
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The recent decisions in Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps15
and Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.'" must be considered
against the background. The Ninth Circuit was confronted with a com-
plex factual situation in Manor Drug. The defendants had been in-
volved in an antitrust action that had resulted in a consent decree"r pro-
viding for the reorganization of Blue Chip Stamp Company and an of-
fering of the reorganized corporation's stock to the non-stockholding
users of Blue Chip Stamps.' 8 In connection with the required offering,
the defendant allegedly prepared a prospectus " 'calculated to mislead
and dissuade users not knowledgeable of the true value of [the] shares
from purchasing [the] shares' "'9 and thereby violated rule lOb-5.
The court, purporting to apply the purchaser-seller rule as set out
in Mount Clemens, identified two functions of the rule. First, the rule
had -to fulfill the intent of Congress to eliminate fraud in the investment
process.2 0 Secondly, the rule had to limit standing under 10b-5 to a
plaintiff with a "provable" case; 21 the plaintiff had to allege a relation-
ship indicating his ability to show" 'proof of loss and the causal connec-
tion with the alleged violation of the Rule.' ",22
15. 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3108 (U.S.
Aug. 15, 1974) (No. 74-124), noted in 8 GA. L. Rnv. 487 (1974).
16. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1979 (1974). The reac-
tion to Eason has been considerable. Note, Standing to Sue in 10b-5 Actions: Eason
v. GMAC and Its Impact on the Birnbaum Doctrine, 49 NoTmn DAMn LAw. 1131
(1974) is a complete discussion of the decision which favors the Eason approach over
the purchaser-seller rule, but perceives problems which can best be solved by congres-
sional action. See 42 FoRDHM L. REv. 688 (1974); 27 VAND. L. REv. 572 (1974) (ap-
plauding Eason).
Judicial reaction to Eason has been less favorable. The Fifth Circuit has expressly
reaffirmed the purchaser-seller rule in Sargeant v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 764 (5th
Cir. 1974); accord, Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974).
The Third Circuit, shortly before Eason, reaffirmed the validity of the Birnbaum
doctrine. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 158 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct.
1979 (1974). Since Eason, the Third Circuit has had the opportunity to repudiate Birn-
baum, but has instead reaffirmed in dictum. In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 494 F.2d
528, 533 n.5 (3d Cir. 1974).
The Supreme Court is not anxious to resolve this conflict between the circuits. De-
nials of certiorari in Eason and Landy came on April 22, 1974 with the Chief Justice
and Justices White and Douglas favoring the granting of certiorari in both cases. 94
S. Ct. 1979 (1974).
17. United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F.2d 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aft'd
mem. sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968).
18. These were the direct victims of the antitrust violation and the 10b-5 plaintiffs.
19. 492 F.2d at 139.
20. Id. at 140.
21. Id. at 141. The court considered this second purpose as the basis for the vari-
ous exceptions which developed under Birnbaum.
22. Id., quoting Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir.
1967).
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Under the traditional purchaser-seller rule, an actual sale or con-
tract for sale provided the necessary proof of loss and causation. In
Manor Drug the consent decree identified the potential purchasers and
the number of shares and the prices of the securities to be offered.
Therefore, the court viewed the consent decree as the functional equiv-
alent of a contract in its effect on the plaintiffs ability to prove loss.
23
Since the plaintiff had satisfied the requirements of the purchaser-seller
rule as defined by the Ninth Circuit, standing was allowed.
The problem with the "provable case" approach to standing is that
the purchaser-seller rule becomes dependent on the merits of the
plaintiff's case, rather than on some neutral principle discernible in the
relationship of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the alleged fraud.
Standing becomes in essence a function of the judge's perceptions of
the equities involved.
In Eason the plaintiffs (Eason and Satrom) were shareholders in
a corporation (Bank Service) which bought an automobile leasing bus-
iness (from Dave Waite Pontiac) after the latter had been extended
credit by GMAC. As part of the consideration, Bank Service issued
7,000 shares of its stock to Dave Waite Pontiac and assumed -the debts
of the leasing business. Eason and Satrom executed guarantees of the
business' indebtedness to GMAC. When Bank Service defaulted,
GMAC brought suit on the guarantees in Indiana state court.2 4 Eason
and Satrom countered with a 10b-5 action in federal court alleging
fraud by GMAC and Dave Waite and seeking recission of the guaran-
tees.2 5  The court found a strict application of the Birnbaum rule to
be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's admonition that 10b-5 be con-
strued broadly and flexibly.26 The court also rejected utilization of -the
liberalized purchaser-seller rule because constant redefinition of the
words "purchaser" and "seller" had rendered the rule ineffectiveY.
2
After holding that
the protection of the rule [10b-5] extends to persons who, in their
capacity as investors, suffered significant injury as a direct conse-
quence of fraud in connection with a securities transaction, even
though their participation in the transaction did not involve either
the purchase or sale of a security, . ..2
23. 492 F.2d at 142. See also International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d
1334 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3666 (U.S. May 31, 1974) (No. 73-
1542), discussed in note 69 infra.
24. 490 F.2d at 656.
25. Id.
26. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
27. 490 F.2d at 659.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
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the court found that Eason and Satrom "were certainly 'investors' in the
transaction which is allegedly tainted by fraud.",'2 By failing to define
"investors," the opinion skirted the central issue of standing.80 The
result in Eason indicates that the law on this issue may have run
through twenty years of lOb-5 litigation without coming any closer to
a satisfactory description of what constitutes standing for a lob-5 pri-
vate action.
The limits of the Manor Drug "provable case" approach to
standing and the Eason "investor" approach may be determined by ap-
plying the holding of each case to the facts of the other. In applying
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Manor Drug to the faots before the
Seventh Circuit in Eason, it is clear that the plaintiffs in Eason had a
"provable case." The history of the acquisition by Bank Service and
the guarantees given by the plaintiffs provide the information necessary
to prove loss and a causal connection. However, a problem arises in
attempting to fit the Eason plaintiffs into the purchaser-seller rubric.
The guarantees given to GMAC could have been viewed as securities
sold by the plaintiffs, but this would have stretched the definition of
"security."3'- An alternative would have been to view the events as a
single transaction. The plaintiffs gave their guarantees inducing
GMAC to permit the transfer of Dave Waite's company to Bank
Service in return for 7,000 shares of stock (securities). However, with
this approach it would have been necessary to treat the plaintiffs as sel-
lers of securities issued by the corporation. This could not be done
because the plaintiffs were suing in -their individual capacities rather
than on behalf of the corporation. 2
Whether the Seventh Circuit's "investor" criterion would have af-
forded standing to the Manor Drug plaintiffs depends on the definition
given to "investor." If the court meant to use the word in the layman's
sense, 3 Manor Drug Stores would have lacked standing because it
never invested in anything. In fact, had the plaintiffs invested, there
would have been no injury; the fraud would have failed.8 4 Judge Kirk-
29. Id.
30. Id. at 660 n.29.
31. Id. at 656.
32. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970) (standing allowed plaintiffs
in derivative capacity, denied in individual capacity).
33. Investor is defined as "one who invests." Invest is defined as "To lay out
(money or capital) in business with the view of obtaining an income or profit ... "
WEBsim's NEw INTRNATONAL DIcIoNAaY (2d ed. 1959).
34. 492 F.2d at 140.
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patrick in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,"5 the first private action un-
der 10b-5, described investors as persons "about to invest"3 6 or already
holding shares, while the Fifth Circuit has defined investors as persons
"engaged in buying and selling and trading."3 7 The Birnbaum rule was
arguably an attempt to define "investor" on the basis of the type of
transaction involved. 8
The Manor Drug plaintiffs would not fit within any of these def-
initions easily. Use of the "about to invest" definition would either re-
duce "investor" to a meaningless standard permitting anyone to sue on
a claimed intent to invest or require the plaintiff to allege an actual at-
tempt to invest. Clearly, the plaintiffs did not meet the "buying and
selling and trading" definition. Without the Ninth Circuit's stretching
of the Birnbaum rule, the plaintiffs would not fit into the purchaser-
seller definition of "investor."
'3 9
The search for a functional standing requirement must start with
some basic propositions. First, accurate analysis requires identifica-
tion of the type of standing involved. Secondly, standing is a function
of the status of the plaintiff and should not depend upon the merits
of the plaintiff's case.4" Thirdly, congressional intent and purpose
should be considered. Finally, it should be recognized that a conflict
exists between the circuits, and the Supreme Court is not anxious to re-
solve the controversy. 41 A new standing criterion is most likely to be
accepted by the "Birnbaum circuits" if that new criterion is responsive
to the results of twenty years of litigation under the purchaser-seller
rubric.
Standing is a function of the statute under which the suit is
brought and of Article III of the Constitution.4" Rule lOb-5 litigation
has focused on statutory standing in situations in which the require-
ments for constitutional standing have been satisfied.43 A number of
commentators44 have approached the statutory standing problem by re-
35. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
36. Id. at 514 (dictum).
37. Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
38. 492 F.2d at 143 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 143 n.1.
40. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
41. See note 16 supra.
42. U.S. CoNsT. art. UT, § 2.
43. See note 7 supra.
44. E.g., Whitaker, supra note 7; Comment, 37 Mo. L. Rav., supra note 4; Com-
ment, 44 U. COLO. L. Rnv., supra note 7.
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lying on a series of cases decided by the Supreme Court" in 1968 and
1970 that support a liberal approach, one favoring plaintiffs in standing
questions. 46  In the most frequently cited case, Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,47 Justice Douglas articu-
lated two ingredients of standing: the Article III requirement of "in-
jury in fact,'48 and "whether the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute .. . in question.
4 9
These cases are not applicable to the 10b-5 standing question.
Since they involved private plaintiffs suing an agent or agency of the
federal government,50 the Justices' perceptions of the Court as a buffer
protecting the citizen in the interface between government and gov-
erned influenced these decisions."1 A correct analysis of 10b-5 stand-
ing must rely upon cases decided in the implied tort context6 2 in which
one private party sues another private party for damages occasioned by
the defendant's violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The
Restatement of Torts section 286 provides that a cause of action exists
for a plaintiff, if the defendant violates a statute enacted for the plain-
tiff's protection. 3 The same requirement was enunciated in 1916 by
the Court: "A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful
45. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv.
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968);
Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
46. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CH. L. REv. 450 (1970).
47. 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 805 (5th Cir.
1970); Note, 24 HAsTiNGS L.J., supra note 4, at 1036 n.105; Comment, 44 U. COLO.
L. REv., supra note 7.
48. 397 U.S. at 152.
49. Id. at 153.
50. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (suit by a tenant farmer challenging
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture); Association of Data Process-
ing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (suit by a private corpora-
tion challenging a ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968) (taxpayer suit challenging the validity of HEW expenditures); Hardin v.
Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968) (suit by private corporation against the TVA).
Other recent decisions on standing are Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)
(injunction sought against the Secretary of the Interior); Investment Co. Institute v.
Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (challenging regulations promulgated by the Comptroller
of the Currency).
51. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 109-14 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); see
Note, NoTn DAmE LAW., supra note 16 (recognizing the distinction between the Data
Processing type of litigation and private lOb-5 actions).
52. 1 A. BROMBERO, SECURMiTEs LAw: FRAuD § 2.4(1)-(2) (1973). The alterna-
tive to implied statutory tort as a theory was voidability under Securities Exchange Act
§ 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970); but this theory lost its hold with the decline of
privity. A. BROMMERG, supra, § 2.4(1) (b).
53. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 286 (1934) provides:
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act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose espe-
cial [sic] benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the dam-
ages from the party in default is implied. . . ."" The cases dealing
with standing to challenge government action do not necessitate the a-
bandonment of the judicial self-restraint that has characterized de-
cisions on standing in implied tort. If the courts substitute their judg-
ment concerning who ought -to be protected from securities fraud for
that of Congress, they would be usurping the legislative function. 5
Statutory standing under 10b-5 depends on whether a plaintiff is
within the class of persons that Congress intended to protect when it
enacted section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.5 6 A reading of the leg-
islative history51 of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act reveals that
Congress intended to establish market conditions in which investment
decisions could be made in a free and honest atmosphere.58 The prob-
lem of uncertainty, inherent in investment decision-making, can be
minimized by the diversification of holdings that offsets the risk of un-
expected loss with the potential of unexpected gain, or by the collection
of more accurate information with which to make decisions. 9 Congress
in the Securities and Exchange Acts attempted -to reduce uncertainty
through the second approach. With an assurance of accurate informa-
tion, the investor can reduce the impact of the risks inherent in invest-
ment decision-making and thereby add stability to the securities
market. 60
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by
failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an inter-
est of another if:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an
interest of the other as an individual; and
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to pro-
tect; and
(c) where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a partic-
ular hazard, the invasion of the interest results from that hazard; and
(d) the violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not
so conducted himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action.
54. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916); accord, Jacobson v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1953), affd mem., 347 U.S. 909 (1954).
55. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92-97 (1968).
56. Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
57. The legislative history of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act has been
compiled in an eleven volume work; J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE SECURTEs Acr OF 1933 AND SEcutrrES ExCHANGE Acr OF 1934 (1973).
58. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934) (Fletcher Report).
59. Hirshleifer, Investment: Investment Decision, in 8 INmNnATIONAL ENCYcLO-
PEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 194, 199-202 (1968).
60. This may have been the logic behind an SEC proposal to use "decision making
groups" in analyzing standing under lOb-5. The proposal is suggested as a solution to
lob-5 standing in Comment, 56 GEo. LJ., supra note 4, at 1186.
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Congress intended to protect the integrity of investment decision-
making rather than to protect the investor per se. This concern for
minimizing risk can be translated into a definition of "investor" by in-
troducing a "transaction" requirement."' In order to obtain investor
status, the plaintiff should be required to allege that the defendants'
actions had an adverse impact upon the integrity of the plaintiff's in-
vestment decision-making.
A transaction requirement is not new to lOb-5 litigation. 2  The
purchaser-seller rule required the plaintiff to allege that fraud touched
a completed transaction.0 3  The exceptions to the Birnbaum rule also
adapt themselves to transaction analysis."4  The Seventh Circuit ap-
parently recognized a transaction requirement in Eason when it refer-
red to the plaintiff's position as an " 'investor' in the transaction...
tainted by fraud," 5 and as a "[principal] in the transaction."00
The corporate mismanagement cases also reflect the influence of
the transaction concept.0 7  In Rekant v. Desser0 8 the plaintiff-share-
holders sued the management of the corporation for fraud (i.e. mis-
management) that involved securities transactions. Standing was al-
lowed in the derivative action and denied in the individual actions.
Under the transaction test the results would be the same. The fraud
did not impair the decision-making of the individuals because they were
not involved in the transaction; however, the corporation was involved
and its decision-making was affected.
The consideration of six possible situations will serve to illustrate
that the transaction test is responsive to the Birnbaum experience.
First, the plaintiff could make and act upon an investment decision.
This is the Eason situation and -the situation covered by a strict pur-
61. This requirement looks at the status of the plaintiff in the abstract and does
not imply use of reliance or materiality criteria.
62. See 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 52, § 8.8. There seems to be a natural ten-
dency to group lob-5 standing cases into groups based upon the type of underlying trans-
action. See Boone & McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 TEXAs L.
REv. 617 (1971); Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing
to Sue Under lob-5 is Involved, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 93 (1970); Whitaker, supra note
7; Note, 24 HASTINGS L.J., supra note 4; Comment, 14 ViLL. L. Rav., supra note 8.
63. E.g., Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952).
64. See note 62 supra; text accompanying notes 70-72 infra.
65. 490 F.2d at 659.
66. Id. at 659-60.
67. For an excellent discussion of issues other than standing in corporate misman-
agement cases see Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate
Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1007 (1973).
68. 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970).
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chaser-seller rule. The defendant sets out to influence an investment
decision, the decision is made and acted upon. Standing should not
be denied; the transaction is complete. 69
Alternatively, interference by the defendant could frustrate the in-
tention of the plaintiff.7" These transactions are the frustrated offers
or aborted contracts for purchase or sale. Since the fraud affects the
plaintiff's investment decision-making, standing should be allowed.
Thirdly, the defendant could force the plaintiff into a decision.71
This is the short form merger in which the plaintiffs decisional freedom
is limited. Standing should be allowed.
Fourthly, manipulation of the market by the defendant could
hinder a plaintiff who desires to make an investment decision.72 This
is the suit for injunctive relief. Standing should be allowed so that the
plaintiff's future investment decision may have full and effective pro-
tection consistent with the intent of Congress.
Fifthly, the plaintiff could be the recipient of a specific and indi-
vidually directed offer, and the actions of the defendant made the offer
less attractive. 73 If the plaintiff does nothing, the situation does not
indicate that the plaintiff made an investment decision, but only that
the defendant intended to interfere with any decision-making that the
plaintiff might make. Standing should be denied because there is no
transaction in which decision-making can be found.
69. In International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3666 (U.S. May 31, 1974) (No. 73-1542), the court stretched the
definition of "sale" in order to give standing to the plaintiff under the purchaser-seller
rule. The plaintiff corporation was induced by a violation of 10b-5 to dispose of port-
folio securities through a dividend in kind to its shareholders. Although no considera-
tion was given by the shareholders, the court held, over the sharp dissent of Judge Mulli-
gan, that the spin-off was a sale. The court admitted that the decision was without
precedential support, id. at 1344, and arguably contrary to an earlier second circuit case,
id. at 1344-45, 1358.
Under a transaction-investor criterion, the plaintiff would have obtained standing
because it made what the court recognized as an important decision concerning its in-
vestment holdings. Id. at 1346.
70. E.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417
F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow,
375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
71. E.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 925 (1972); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970); Vine v. Bene-
ficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
72. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950
(1970); Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 1969); Mutual Shares
Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546 (2d Cir. 1967).
73. This is the situation presented in Manor Drug; see text accompanying notes
17-19 supra.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The final situation is virtually identical to the immediately preced-
ing one except that the offer was not directed to any particular individ-
uals. 4 If the class of offerees is not defined, it is difficult to identify
the persons who could have reasonably made any investment decision
vis-a-vis the offer; therefore, the logic of denying standing becomes
stronger.
In the first four situations, the plaintiff transacts business, attempts
to transact business, or wishes to transact business in securities. The
transactions involve the investment decision-making process that Con-
gress sought to protect. The plaintiff is the decision-maker; therefore
the plaintiff should be protected by lob-5 and standing should be al-
lowed.
The last two situations will be the battle field of controversy under
the investor criterion. Those who favor a virtually limitless reach for
10b-5 will argue that these last two situations should result in standing
for the plaintiff. In substance, their argument will be first that the
Supreme Court requires a broad and flexible interpretation of section
10(b) and 10b-5 75 and that cases like Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp7 6 have liberalized standing require-
ments. However, Data Processing and the related standing cases do
not apply to the 10b-5 situations.7" The broad and flexible construc-
tion concept must be balanced against the traditional requirements of
judicial self-restraint.78  While the Supreme Court wishes the lower
courts to adhere to congressional purpose by giving the benefit of the
doubt to a victim rather than a defrauder, it does not follow that the
lower courts should ignore the congressional decision to protect only
investors.
CONCLUSION
This note developed a functional interpretation of the statutory
standing criteria for litigation between private parties under 10b-5.
Standing will be given to investors - persons who make, attempt to
make, or wish to make investment decisions in a securities transaction.
This interpretation leaves to the states their traditional powers to
regulate corporate management 79 and preserves the tradition of judicial
74. This is the situation presented in Mount Clemens Indus.,'Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d
339 (9th Cir. 1972).
75. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
76. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
77. See notes 50-51 and accompanying text supra.
78. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
79. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). "We
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self-restraint in the determination of standing questions.80
A transaction-investor standard of standing determines standing
not on the merits of the plaintiff's case, but on the neutral principles
discernible from the position of the plaintiff vis-a-vis the investment de-
cision-making process."' At the same time, the standard tends to elim-
inate plaintiffs with unprovable claims.82 The transaction concept pro-
vides an element of flexibility, 3 and the decision-making approach pro-
vides some certainty. Finally, the lessons of the Birnbaum experience
are not ignored.
C. CLINTON STRETCH
Tax-Only God Knows For Sure But the I.R.S. Makes a Good
Guess-Use of the Treasury Department's Actuarial Tables
An individual's life expectancy determines, in many tax situations,
the number of tax dollars the federal government will receive. Conse-
quently, the method used to measure this expectancy is extremely im-
portant to both the Internal Revenue Service and the taxpayer. How-
ever, the courts disagree' on whether this valuation should be based
upon actual expectancy or actuarial expectancy.'
agree that Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute
no more than internal corporate mismanagement." Id. at 12.
80. See notes 55 & 78 and accompanying text supra.
81. See note 4 supra.
82. This was the concern of the court in Manor Drug; see note 21 supra.
83. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
1. Compare Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 443 F.2d 116 (5th
Cir. 1971), with Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 32 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 6235 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
2. "Actual expectancy" involves consideration of all facts pertinent to an indi-
vidual's state of health. "Actuarial expectancy" is determined by extensive averaging
of the population as a whole and does not consider the state of health of the specific
individual in question.
The statutory foundation for the actuarial tables is INT. REV. CODE Op 1954,
§ 7805(a), which authorizes the issuance of "all needful rules and regulations" for the
enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code. These tables are used by the Internal Rev-
enue Service for a variety of tax purposes in valuing annuities, life estates, remainders
and reversions. Some of these purposes are: (a) Valuation of general life estates with
remainer interests to others; (b) Valuation of life annuities [But see ABA, Memoran-
dum of Feb. 11, 1974 (Proposal C) concerning changes in section 72(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code]; (c) Valuation of income interests in funds for terms for years; (d) Val-
uation of annuity interests for terms for years; (e) Valuation in corporation-stockholder
